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Combatting Disability Discrimination: A Comparative Critique of France and 
Great Britain  
 




This article examines disabled people’s employment in Great Britain and France. Although 
both countries have poor rates of employment for disabled people compared to non-disabled 
people, Great Britain’s disabled people’s employment rate is lower than France’s. Possible 
explanations include weak enforcement mechanisms in Great Britain, British judicial 
resistance, the lack of an institutional role for British trade unions resulting in an 
implementation gap and the proactive form of French law, a quota-levy scheme, which has 
no British parallel. The conclusions suggest which of these explanations are the most 
plausible and propose that Great Britain considers adopting some French provisions, thus 
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Employment is a mark of societal inclusion, but disabled people have a history of social exclusion in 
many countries, including Great Britain and France, with a higher incidence of working on non-
standard contracts, working part-time hours and earning less than their non-disabled peers 
(Grammenos, 2013).  As we show below however, France has significantly higher rates of 
employment of disabled people than Great Britain and our research question seeks to understand the 
explanatory factors for the differing employment rates in the two countries.   
We compare Great Britain and France because despite some differences, they exhibit many 
similarities. Thus, although France has a civil law base and Great Britain has a common law base, 
both countries are committed to ensuring work for disabled people (Bertrand, 2013; DWP, 2015). 
Also, both countries are currently covered by European Union (EU) disability law (Directive 2000/78 
EC) and subscribe to the European Commission’s Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (European 
Commission, 2010).  
Our research objective is to consider possible explanations for these two countries’ differing 
employment rates of disabled people. To do so, we draw on official materials, statutes, handbooks, 
case law and legal commentaries in English and French.  This analysis, which was carried out by 
French and English-speaking researchers who were familiar with the equality context in both 
countries, was supplemented by some expert interviews: five in France and four in the UK to clarify 
law and public policy. To this end, we draw on employment law, labour economics, industrial 
relations and industrial sociology and the plan of this article is as follows. First, having looked at 
some comparative statistics, we deal with the form of the law and judicial resistance. Then we turn to 
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enforcement by the state, by individuals and by trade unions. Next, we consider labour market 
activation policies, finally discussing our conclusions. 
 
 
The statistics: disabled people’s employment 
  
The statistics shown here are taken from a pan-European survey, the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) facilitating international comparison and we focus on 
employment per se. Consideration of economic inequality and occupational segregation, important as 
they are, is beyond the scope of this article. 
The EU-SILC survey defines a disabled person as a person who reports that they are limited 
in the activities they usually do because of health problems for at least the last six months and covers 
all individuals over the age of 16 living in private households (i.e. not institutionalized). Also, it 
covers the United Kingdom (UK), although this article focuses for the most part on Great Britain, 
(that is England, Wales and Scotland, not Northern Ireland.i). This is because Northern Ireland’s 
disability law differs somewhat from Great Britain’s.  
Table 1 shows that 46 per cent of disabled people aged 20- 64 are employed in the UK 
compared to 54 per cent in France and that there is an employment gap of 34 per cent between 
disabled and non-disabled people in the UK compared to 19 per cent in France.  Table 1 also 
differentiates by gender. As shown, disabled women in both countries face a double disadvantage: a 
lower employment rate than non-disabled women and a lower employment rate than disabled men.  
 
‘Table one about here’ 
 
‘Table two about here’ 
 
Table 2 distinguishes between moderately disabled people and severely disabled people. 
These figures are also based on self-report, and as noted above, the survey asked about ‘limitation in 
activities people usually do because of health problems for at least the last 6 months’, but for Table 2 
the possible answers were: 1. yes, strongly limited; 2. yes, limited; 3. no, not limited. These figures 
show that although moderately disabled people are more likely to be employed in the UK than in 
France, severely disabled people are more likely to be employed in France than in the UK.  
 
‘Table three about here’ 
 
In both countries, the employment rate for disabled people and all people peaks at 35-44 
years. The employment rate of disabled people in the UK, however, is lower than that of France at all 
ages except 16-24, although the gap reduces in the 55-64 age group.   
The EU-SILC statistics have been used because they are the only available statistics providing 
a cross national comparison on the disability employment rate, but as noted above they are based on 
self-report and the subjective view of respondents who may inflate the incidence and severity of their 
health problem to rationalize labour force non-participation and the receipt of disability benefits. 
Benitez Silva et al., (2004), however, in an American study, found that overall individuals’ evaluation 
of their disability was on average the same as the Social Security Administration’s evaluation of that 
disability: although many seemed to inflate the evaluation of their disability, just as large a part of the 
population did exactly the opposite. That study though was intra-country and cross-country 
comparisons are more problematic, as self-report may be influenced by social and cultural factors and 
the benefit system (OECD, 2016). For example, Groot (2000) showed that Danish and Swedish 
respondents tended to largely over-rate their health, while Germans tended to under-rate their health. 
Bearing in mind these limitations, the EU-SILC survey suggests that disabled people are more 
likely to be employed in France than in the UK irrespective of gender and we now seek to understand 
explanations for this variation.  
 
 





A possible explanation for variation between Great Britain and France in respect of disability 
employment is the form of the law in the two countries. One form is command and control which 
posits that a rational individual will try to avoid sanctions (Tyler and Blader, 2005) but this can 
engender resistance and adversarialism, thus creating unintended harm resulting in reduced 
employment outcomes for minority groups (Maroto and Pettinicchio, 2014). Another form is self-
regulation which posits that individuals internalize rules and choose to follow them without rewards 
and sanctions (Tyler and Blader, 2005), but the extent to which this is done will vary between 
organisations. A third form, which avoids command and control and self-regulation, is to shape the 
law to ‘nudge’ employers to behave in a certain way (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Thaler and Sunstein 
argue that this combines libertarianism, (as actors are free to choose), with paternalism, (as actors are 
influenced in a way that contributes to a government’s goal), and immodestly they claim that the 
deployment of ‘both incentives and nudges…can help solve many of society’s major problems’ 




The French quota-levy scheme 
 
France has a quota-levy scheme which has no British parallel. Private sector companies and public 
authorities in France employing 20 employees or more are obliged to employ 6 per cent of disabled 
people among their total workforce. The quota system was introduced in 1924 and was 10 per cent of 
the total workforce until 1957, when it was reduced to 3 per cent between 1957 and 1987 (Romien, 
2005). It was then raised to 6 per cent from 1987. We have been unable to discover the reason for the 
percentage figure.ii 
The workers included in the quota are those who have obtained official recognition of their 
disability, known as the Recognition of the Quality of a Disabled Worker (RQTH), which is granted 
to those aged 16 and over with no upper age limit, for one to five years, on a renewable basis and 
applies to employees and volunteers (Ferri and Lawson, 2016). A decision on RQTH is made by the 
Commission des Droits et de l'Autonomie des Personnes Handicapées (CDAPH) after advice from a 
multi-disciplinary team, although RQTH is granted automatically to those with an invalidity or 
occupational injury pension. In 2014, 95 per cent of disabled workers’ recognition demands were 
accepted (Barhoumi and Chabanon, 2015:12).  
Those officially recognized are only obliged to inform the employer of their RQTH status if 
they wish to do so, for instance to seek adjustments to their working conditions or workplace. 
Klarsfeld et al (2012: 315), however, maintain that employers ‘encourage workers to disclose hidden 
impairments, sometimes offering financial incentives’ in order to meet the quota. 
To comply with the quota, employers can directly employ disabled people and/or include 
disabled workers in sheltered employment or disabled independent workers who provide goods and 
services to them for up to half the quota (3 per cent of their workforce). They can also take on 
disabled people as trainees under the Vocational Training Act of up to 2 per cent of the workforce. 
Another way that employers can meet the quota is to conclude an approved joint agreement setting 
out how they will promote the employment of disabled people. We return to these agreements below.  
Employers who fail to fulfill their quota in full or in part must pay a levy to the  
Association de Gestion du Fonds pour l'Insertion Professionnelle des Personnes Handicapées 
(AGEFIPH), the body responsible for collecting the levy from private sector employers, or to Le 
Fonds pour l'Insertion des Personnes Handicapées dans la Fonction Publique (FIPHFP), its public 
sector equivalent. France’s levy at the time of writing equates to 400 times the hourly minimum wage 
per missing disabled employee for organisations with 20 to 199 employees, 500 times the hourly 
minimum wage for organisations with 501 to 749 employees and 600 times the hourly minimum wage 
for organisations with 750 plus employees. Since 2009, where organisations have made no 
improvement in the number of disabled people they employ directly or through contracting out in a 
three year period, the levy is increased to 1,500 times the hourly minimum wage per missing disabled 
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employee. In 2012, 22 per cent of private sector companies only paid the levy; 27 per cent of 
companies met the quota fully by directly employing disabled workers, 11 per cent had an approved 
agreement, while 40 per cent had at least one disabled employee and/or sub-contracted and/or paid the 
levy in part. (AGEFIPH, 2015a). 
Waddington (2000) argues that the quota system is philosophically flawed: it assumes that 
only if employers are obliged to hire disabled workers (or pay a levy instead) will they do so and that 
the protected group is inferior. Similarly, Sargeant et al (2016) criticize quota systems for sending out 
mixed messages: on the one hand, the employment of disabled people is desirable, but on the other 
hand disabled people are unable to compete on equal terms. Furthermore, quota systems focus on the 
number of disabled people employed, rather than their skills and position in the organisation’s 
hierarchy. 
Waddington (2000:41) admits, however, that quota schemes ‘are frequently popular with 
people with disabilities’ and Grammenos (2013: 5) points out that the six EU countries with the 
lowest activity gap between disabled and non-disabled people all have quotas: Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia.. Furthermore, Fuchs (2014) says that according to available 
empirical data, quota systems lead to small net employment gains for disabled people, a point with 
which Sargeant et al (2016: 14), when examining quota schemes in Italy and Russia, tentatively agree, 
saying that ‘quota systems may help to increase the participation of disabled people in the labour 
market’.   
Meziani et al. (2014) submit that quota schemes could cause discrimination between disabled 
people as the employer might be more willing to hire people with a minor impairment to meet the 
quota, instead of a more severely disabled person. Table 2, however, indicates that more severely 
disabled people are employed in France, where there is a quota-levy scheme, than in the UK where 
there is no such quota-levy. 
 
 
Great Britain’s public sector equality duty 
 
Great Britain, unlike France, has a Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) (Equality Act, 2010, s.149). 
The PSED is based on the premise that the causes of discrimination and inequality are deeply rooted 
in societal structures and institutions and positive duties change the focus from individual wrongdoing 
to focus on the organisations in the best position to promote equality (Fredman, 2012). Under the 
PSED public sector bodies have a general duty to have ‘due regard’ to three matters: first, the 
elimination of discrimination, harassment, victimisation and ‘any other conduct’ prohibited by law; 
second, the advancement of ‘equality of opportunity between those who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and those who do not share it’ and third, the fostering of ‘good relations between those 
who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not’.iii Public sector bodies are 
required to publish annual information to demonstrate their compliance. Alongside the general duty 
are specific duties, which vary in England, Scotland and Wales, with England’s being the least 
prescriptive. 
The PSED has a number of defects. First, the duty does not relate to private bodies exercising 
purely private functions, whereas the French quota-levy scheme has no such limitation. Second, the 
duty lacks clarity. For instance, bodies covered by the general duty must have ‘due regard’ to the 
elimination of discrimination, but it is not clear what ‘due regard’ means. Third, under the English 
regulations, organisations are not required to carry out monitoring or an equality impact assessment or 
consult with trade union equality representatives (unlike the equivalent Welsh and Scottish 
regulations). Fourth, the PSED is enforceable only by way of judicial review and does not give rise to 
any private law rights.  
The PSED has been criticized by commentators of different political complexions. For 
instance, a Government commissioned review found: ‘In far too many cases we have uncovered 
useless bureaucratic practices which do nothing for equality’ (Government Equalities Office, 2013: 
6), while Fredman (2011: 427) said: ‘Without a duty to take action, the risk of proceduralism is 
difficult to overcome’. 
 






A further potential explanation is that the variation in disabled people’s employment rates in France 
and Great Britain depends not only on the form of the law, but also on the extent to which there is 
judicial resistance and conservative judgments in the nation’s courts, resulting in the law failing to 
secure adequate outcomes for minorities (Maroto and Pettinicchio, 2014). Tokson (2015) argues that 
judges may be motivated to resist legal change as they develop biases in favour of the law they have 
repeatedly applied and justified, while Machura (2016) argues that judges may be tempted to support 
the powerful rather than the disadvantaged.  
In Great Britain, there are examples of restrictive judicial interpretations of the legislation that 
makes it very difficult for a disabled person to win a case and here we give just two egregious 
examples: Quinlan v B&Q plc (1998) and London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm (2008). In the 
former case, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that Quinlan was not disabled as he could lift 
every-day objects, even though he could not lift the objects he was required to lift at his workplace. In 
the latter case, the House of Lord, by a majority, held that Malcolm’s comparator was a non-disabled 
person, not another disabled person. It took further legislation to obviate that judgment. Yet some 
judicial decisions have expanded the interpretation of British law. For instance in Archibald v Fife 
Council (2004), the Supreme Court held that the duty to make a reasonable adjustment for a disabled 
person could extend to placing that person in a post of the same or a higher grade without a 
competitive interview. In Coleman v Atteridge Law (2007) an employment tribunal asked the 
European Court of Justice whether protection against discrimination should be extended to a carer of 
a disabled personiv and this eventually resulted in associative discrimination being outlawed 
throughout the EU. 
In France there is far less opportunity for judicial resistance than in Great Britain, as the main 
avenue for individual enforcement in discrimination issues is not through the courts, but through the 
Défenseur du Droits (DDD), which is akin to a mediation body staffed by investigators who are not 
professional judges.  In short, the DDD investigates complaints from individuals of less favourable 
treatment, harassment, associative discrimination and failure by the employer to make a reasonable 
accommodation and then makes a recommendation, albeit of a persuasive, not legally binding nature.  
A complainant dissatisfied with the decision or recommendation (and the DDD resolves most 
complaints) can take their case, if in the private sector, to a labour court (Conseil de Prud’hommes); 
public servants can take a case to the administrative tribunal and any individual can file a complaint. 
with the crown prosecutor, the police or the senior examining magistrate of the crown court (Tribunal 
de Grande Instance). Unfortunately, there are no statistics which indicate how many disability 






It is argued that stronger law will not necessarily lead to improved outcomes for minorities, what is 
needed is stronger implementation ‘to give substantive effect to formal rights, reducing the likelihood 
of adverse treatment and promoting fairer workplaces’ (Dickens, 2012:1). If enforcement mechanisms 
are weak, the law will be ‘like paper tigers, fierce in appearance, but missing in tooth and claw’ 
(Hepple, 2002:238). 
There are various forms of enforcement: first is state enforcement, which requires the state 
and state agencies to be adequately funded if law breakers are to be successfully identified and 
punished. In addition, state agencies can encourage, but not require, employers to behave in certain 
ways but if compliance is not forthcoming they can impose sanctions. Second, there is individual 
enforcement. Third, there is enforcement by trade unions. Trade unions can mediate the law directly 
by taking cases on behalf of members. They can also have an indirect effect on equality, through 
equality representatives and collective bargaining (Bacon and Hoque, 2012).  
 






Dealing first with Great Britain, a state agency, The Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC), has the power to conduct inquiries and formally investigate specific organisations and can 
issue an Unlawful Act Notice, which may include an action plan; (there is a right of appeal to an 
appropriate court or tribunal.) In addition, the EHRC can make agreements even if it has not 
conducted a formal investigation. It can also enforce the specific duties of the PSED by issuing a non-
compliance notice.  
Whatever the EHRC’s powers in theory, in practice they are weak. First, an Unlawful Act 
Notice or Non-Compliance Notice created by the EHRC cannot be enforced by the EHRC itself and 
necessitates an application to the civil courts. Indeed, the EHRC favours agreements in lieu of 
investigations and has, to date, not issued any Non-Compliance Notices (EHRC, 2016a; EHRC, 
2016b). Secondly, the EHRC’s investigations are often general, rather than organisation specific and 
lead to general recommendations, not sanctions (O’Brien, 2012). Thirdly, these powers have been 
little used in the employment context. These enforcement failures may be partly because of budget 
cuts. The EHRC had a budget of £70 million per year when it was established in 2007, which was cut 
to £17.1 million per year in 2016-17 (Pring, 2016). 
Turning to direct state enforcement in France, there are labour inspectors who are authorised 
to uncover unlawful acts in matters of discrimination under the Criminal Code. There are no statistics 
available, however, on labour inspectors’ activities in respect of disability employment.  
French state agencies are also involved in enforcing the quota-levy scheme. If an organisation does 
not fulfil its quota, it must pay a levy and the higher the levy, the more a rational organisation will 
choose to fulfil its quota and thus meet the aim of French public policy. Increasingly French 
employers are meeting the quota: the percentage of companies directly employing disabled people 





In both countries, disabled people have the right to not be discriminated against in employment. 
Importantly, the law in both countries requires the employer to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ or to 
take ‘appropriate measures’ to quote the British and French phrases respectively, in order to enable 
disabled people to have access to, or retain employment, unless the adjustment/measure would impose 
a disproportionate burden on the employer. These rights, however, have to be enforced by individuals 
and in Great Britain this is through employment tribunals, but this enforcement mechanism has flaws.  
First, where British individuals make a claim to an employment tribunal they had to pay fees 
of £1,200 from 2013 until quashed in 2017 when the Supreme Court held that the fee system was 
inconsistent with access to justice. Interestingly, the government admitted that fees had had ‘a greater 
financial impact on people with disabilities compared with people who do not have a disability’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2017:50).  
Second, British claimants have to marshal the evidence and navigate legal complexities. 
including an adversarial procedure with cross-examination at its heart.  Also, they first have to 
establish that they are disabled, meeting a legal definition which, is narrower and more complex than 
the French definition. Indeed, Lawson (2011: 362) maintains that ‘defendants often deliberately 
choose to challenge the disabled status of a claimant as a strategy for … pressurising them into 
settling or withdrawing the case’. Moreover, perhaps unsurprisingly, in view of the intricacy of the 
legislation, British claimants are unlikely to win their case: in the three months from April 2015 just 
five per cent of disability discrimination claims were successful (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Finally, 
even when disabled claimants do succeed, the remedy is compensation, not reinstatement, even if an 
employment tribunal has held that they have lost their job as a result of disability discrimination. 
Moreover, such compensation is normally unlikely to be substantial: the median award was £11,309 
in 2015-16. (Clark, 2016). 
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In contrast, France’s DDD has always been free to claimants, and if French claimants do not 
accept a DDD recommendation they can go to the Conseil de Prud’hommes, that is now free too. 
(Formerly it was only €35.)  Also, it is strongly arguable that the DDD’s investigative approach is less 
stressful for French claimants than the adversarial, cross-examination based approach in Great 
Britain’s employment tribunals. Furthermore, whereas British claimants have a poor adjudicative 
success rate, 80 per cent of the cases that the DDD investigates are resolved (DDD, 2014). Moreover, 
the DDD, unlike many British private mediation bodies, publishes its decisions which include an 
examination of the complaint in the light of the law, so norms are articulated. 
 
 
Trade union enforcement 
 
Having considered state enforcement and individual enforcement, we now turn to trade union 
enforcement. British trade unions support their disabled members through workplace casework and by 
providing legal representation for those wanting to claim disability discrimination at an employment 
tribunal, although we have not found any statistics.  
In addition, there are some 1,400 trade union equality representatives in British workplaces 
(TUC, 2010) and their role is to encourage employers to improve equality policies and practices, offer 
independent advice on equality issues to employees, monitor the employer’s policies and practices, 
and raise the profile of the equality agenda within their unions and workplaces. Bacon and Hoque 
(2012) found that over three-fifths of equality representatives reported having had a positive impact 
on their employer’s disability practices and also were more likely to report having more influence on 
disability policies than on any other equality strand (Bacon and Hoque, 2012).  
British trade unions have also appointed so-called disability champions, of which there over 
500. Bacon and Hoque (2015) found that 71 per cent reported ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ influence on 
employer willingness to conduct disability audits of documents, buildings or procedures and 
57 per cent reported ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ influence on employer equal opportunities practices 
with regard to disability. In addition, one trade union, the Transport and Salaried Staffs Association 
(TSSA), appointed some 80 neuro-diversity champions who achieved some success in influencing 
employer disability practices, for instance obtaining workplace adjustments (Richards and Sang, 
2016).  
Importantly however, union equality representatives, disability champions and neuro-
diversity champions do not have a statutory right be consulted, to have paid time off to carry out their 
duties or to have office facilities, unlike other categories of British trade union representatives. 
Moreover, although the government initially funded TUC training for disability champions and TSSA 
support for its neuro-diversity champions, this funding has now been withdrawn. 
In contrast, French trade unions, unlike British trade unions have a significant disability role 
enshrined in law. First, they have seats on the CDAPH, the body mentioned above which is 
responsible for recognising a person’s disabled status and on the governing boards of the AGEFIPH 
(2015b) and the FIPHFP (2015), setting policy on the expenditure of the funds collected from the 
levies on employers who have not met the quota.  
Second, staff representatives (délégues du personnel), who are in theory mandatory in firms 
of 11 employees or more, have a right to draw the attention of management to any breach of 
employees’ individual rights (droit des personnes), a broad notion encompassing employees’ physical 
and psychological wellbeing and ‘individual liberties’ at work v. If no resolution is possible at the 
workplace, a Conseil de Prud’hommes may hear the dispute (private sector only). In such cases, the 
judges may issue an order which could include requiring management to conduct an investigation 
with staff representatives. Third, most French trade unions help all individuals who wish to take a 
case, (not just union members as in Great Britain).  
Fourth, French trade unions have a role in collective bargaining through information and 
consultation bodies. This has a disability dimension because employers and trade unions have to 
negotiate annually on disability at enterprise levelvi and every three years they have to negotiate on the 
subject at a sectoral level.vii Accordingly, French employee representatives can conclude joint 
agreements with the employer to promote the employment of disabled people. These essentially spell 
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out the ways in which the quota is to be met and/or how money that the employer would otherwise 
have to pay to AGEFIPHP/FIPHP is to be spent, but such enterprise level agreements have to be 
approved by a state agency, the Directions Régionales des Entreprises, de la Concurrence, de la 
Consommation, du Travail et de l'Emploi (DIRRECTE). See the agreements at Accor, Carrefour and 
Sodexo (International Labour Office, 2010) and more recently at Renault.viii  Agreements can also be 
made at national and sectoral level in which event they have to be approved by the Délégation 
Générale à l’Emploi et à la Formation Professionnelle (DGEFP). A study found that such joint 
agreements promote the implementation of disability policies and also facilitate social dialogue 
between employers and trade unions, as disability is a unifying topic (DARES, 2016b). 
Nevertheless, even though disabled people’s employment is a topic in negotiations, it is often 
marginal (Maggi-Germain, 2010). Furthermore, such collective agreements are uncommon: only 11 
per cent of companies signed such agreements in 2012 (AGEFIPH, 2015a). In particular, small 
companies often find it difficult to dedicate human resources to such negotiations, although there is 
some evidence that this is a prerequisite for the implementation of a disability agreement (Maggi-
Germain 2010).  
Moreover, even if there are joint agreements, they are not without shortcomings. First, they 
can be used primarily as a means to enhance the company’s brand, rather than to make significant 
advances in respect of the integration of disabled people into the workforce (Blatge, 2010). Second, 
according to Barel and Frémeaux (2012) companies may adopt reactive strategies, for instance 
employing disabled people directly or indirectly only to offset the payment of the disability levy as 
opposed to adopting proactive strategies, for instance making the diversity dimension a key plank of 
their human resource management. Nevertheless, whatever their shortcomings, collective agreements 
are even rarer and less specific in Great Britain than in France and, where they are found, as in local 
government, they are confined to an equal opportunities clause which includes a reference to 
disability (EurWork, 2001).  
 
 
Labour activation policies 
 
As Kahn Freund (1969: 311) said: ‘Many people have something like a magic belief in the efficacy of 
the law in shaping human conduct and social relations. It is a superstition’. Similarly, Hepple (1992) 
submits that law is both too specific and too selective to deliver substantive equal rights. Therefore, 
part of the explanation for the higher employment rate of disabled people in France compared to the 
UK is not to be found in the law, but could be in labour activation policies, particularly training and 
the provision of aids, which are aimed at increasing the supply of disabled employees. 
In France, the budget for labor activation policies for disabled people comes from the levy 
and is ring-fenced and thus not subject to any government cuts and the state agencies, AGEFIPH or 
the FIPHFP, are responsible for redistributing the levy. In 2014, AGEFIPH spent more than €60 
million on training disabled people, more than €100 million on employment integration including 
providing disabled people with advice on job searching, and more than €92 million on job retention, 
for instance advising companies and providing finance for workplace adjustments (AGEFIPH, 2014). 
This entailed financially contributing to 71,277 work placements, 18,669 job retentions and 2,569 
apprenticeship contracts in favor of disabled individuals (AGEFIPH, 2014).  
In Great Britain too, grants can be provided to help disabled people obtain or stay in work, but 
such provision is fragmented. The main vehicle is the Access to Work provides advice and financial 
support for disabled employees and their employers to implement alterations to the workplace, for 
instance special equipment, fares to work if public transport cannot be used and disability awareness 
training. The most common type of adjustment is time related or part -time work requests (William, 
2016); in such instances Access to Work may advise the employer how to implement these 
adjustments, but despite Access to Work’s involvement, adjustments are usually slowly implemented 
(William, 2016).  
In 2015-16 32,150 disabled people benefitted from Access to Work, and although Access to 
Work programme expenditure ‘is not routinely published’ it is known that in 2013-14 expenditure 
was £108 million (Clarke, 2016:3). This compares poorly with AGEPIFH’s expenditure. 
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Moreover, in contrast to the ring-fenced money in France, these British Access to Work grants are 
subject to government cuts. For instance, in March 2015, the Government announced changes to the 
scheme: a cap of £40,800 per disabled person, calculated at one and a half times annual salary, 
uprated annually (Clarke, 2016).ix   
Access to Work, however, is not the only government funded vehicle to support disabled 
people’s employment. The government funded Work Choice programme in turn funds public, private 
and voluntary organisations to deliver work entry and in-work support, as does the Work Programme 
which covers all those unemployed, not just disabled people and also is delivered by a range of 
providers. Both the Work Programme and the Work Choice Programme are to be replaced by a Work 
and Health Programme, again using a range of providers and not solely targeted at disabled people.     
In France, labour activation policies include the state’s provision of sheltered employment. 
This is based on the premise that those with severe impairments are capable of economically valuable 
work. In 2012, 118,211 disabled workers were employed in an Etablissement et Service d’Aides par 
le Travail (ESAT) with ‘a legal status similar to employees’ (Policy Department A, 2015: 22)  for 
people with one third or less work capacity loss. Arguably sheltered employment permanently 
‘ghettoizes’ disabled workers, as ‘there has been a notable lack of success in moving disabled workers 
to the open labor market’ (Waddington, 2000:42), partly due to a lack of relevant training possibilities 
(Baret, 2013) and only 3 per cent of those in ESATs move into the open market (Policy Department 
A,. 2015: 27.  ESATs also find it difficult to reconcile their economic and socio-medical objectives 
(Baret, 2012). 
In a partial move away from sheltered employment, French businesses can adapt part of their 
premises for disabled workers, called Enterprises Adaptées which provide semi-sheltered 
employment. Such adapted businesses employed 31,000 disabled people in 2014 (AGEFIPH, 2015a).  
In contrast to France, Great Britain has moved away from government owned sheltered employment, 
known as Remploy factories, as by 2013 it had closed or sold Remploy’s factories, whilst its 
employment service, aimed at enabling disabled people to take up non-sheltered employment, was 
privatized (BBC, 2014). Remploy now focuses on a return to work service which helps disabled 




Discussion and conclusions 
 
This article focuses on employment rate as a measure of disabled people’s (in)equality. It appreciates 
that there are other important measures, particularly the extent of occupational segregation and 
comparisons of income levels, but they are beyond the scope of this article. Furthermore, we focus on 
industrial relations explanations (employment law/labour economics/industrial sociology), not wider 
social factors such as disabled people’s access to education, public transport and adapted housing, 
although acknowledging that such factors have a mediating role in respect of disabled people’s 
employment (Levet, 2007; Blanc, 2009; Jacquinot, 2009).     
This article has noted that both in the UK and France disabled people’s employment rate is 
significantly lower than non-disabled people’s employment rate, but France’s rate of disabled 
people’s employment is higher than the UK’s, although these statistics have limitations as discussed 
above. Against that background we return to our research question and consider explanations for this 
difference, but because a counter-factual cannot be constructed, we can only indicate those 
explanations that we find the most plausible. 
First, we considered whether the difference stems from the form of the law. As shown above, 
the key plank of the French approach is the quota-levy scheme and this seems to have some positive 
implementation effect as evidenced by the growing number of employers directly employing disabled 
people as the law nudges, but does not command French employers to behave in a certain way (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008).  The British approach to ‘nudging’ is the PSED, but it is inadequate: it does not 
cover the private sector; its wording is ambiguous and there is no ‘carrot’ for employers unlike in 
France. Accordingly, we think the form of the law is a plausible explanation for the differing disabled 
person’s employment gap in the two countries.  
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Second, we considered judicial resistance and we have shown how there are many more 
opportunities for judicial resistance in Great Britain than in France, because whereas in Great Britain 
the main avenue for complainants is the courts, in France the main avenue is a non-judicial 
investigative body, the DDD. Yet while we have given examples of judicial resistance in Great 
Britain, there are examples of judicial decisions which advance the interpretation of disability 
legislation.x Accordingly, we do not think judicial resistance is a plausible explanation for the 
differing disabled person’s employment gap in Great Britain and France.  
Third, enforcement provides another avenue for explanation: we have shown that in Great 
Britain there is an implementation gap as the EHRC has never applied sanctions for non-compliance, 
although empowered to do so (EHRC, 2016a) and British individuals face problems bringing a case to 
an employment tribunal where they have to adopt an adversarial approach based on cross-examination 
and, in any event, are most unlikely to win. In contrast, in France state agencies enforce the quota-
levy scheme and individuals enforce their rights through a complaint to the DDD which investigates 
and makes a recommendation to the parties. As to trade union enforcement, although French trade 
unions have an institutionalised role in implementation, unlike their British counterparts, French 
collective agreements are uncommon and those that are concluded have shortcomings. Accordingly, 
whereas trade union enforcement does not offer a plausible explanation for France’s greater 
proportion of disabled people in employment compared to Great Britain’s, its mode of both state and 
individual enforcement may do. 
Finally, we consider that labour activation policies are a plausible explanation: in France, the 
money from the levy is ring fenced. In contrast the British government has a fragmented approach to 
supporting disabled people’s employment, such funding is not ring fenced and what information we 
have found suggests that there is significantly less money devoted to it, compared to France.  
To summarize, the form of the law, enforcement mechanisms by the state, and/or by 
individuals and labour activation policies are the most plausible explanations for disabled people’s 
higher rate of employment in France compared to Great Britain. We add that these factors are not 
mutually exclusive, responding to the call for research to consider multiple explanations for the 
disadvantage of minority groups (Maroto and Pettinicchio, 2014).  
In conclusion, and in the light of the finding that the six EU countries with the lowest activity 
gap between disabled and non-disabled people have quota schemes (Grammenos, 2013), we propose 
that further research should be undertaken to test these hypotheses and, in particular, to explore 
whether a quota-levy scheme on the French model could be used to enhance, not replace Great 
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Source EU-SILC 2012 from final report by S. Grammenos (2014) for ANED 
Note: The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of people aged 20-64 in 




 Disabled  % Not disabled % Total population % 
France 53.6 (men + women) 72.6 (men + women) 69.1 (men + women) 
51.3 (females) 69.0 (females) 65.6 (females) 
56.2 (males) 76.3  (males) 72.8 (males) 
UK 45.9 (men + women) 80.1 (men + women) 74.4 (men + women) 
44.6 (females) 75.3 (females) 69.9 (females) 
47.4 (males) 84.9 (males) 79.1 (males) 
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UK 74.4 65.2 23.7 44.6 47.4 75.3 84.9 
France 69.1 60.5 37.1 51.3 56.2 69 76.3 
Sources: Priestly, M (2014: 5)  and Meziani, M et al., (2014:5)  
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Table 3: Employment rate by disability and age 2012 


























France 21.5 67.9 72.6 70.4 29.8 52.0 29.5 80.0 85.1 84.6 39.7 65.1 
UK 29.5 50.0 53.1 51.1 36.8 44.6 44.3 80.0 80.1 82.9 60.5 70.5 
SILC 2012 from final report by S. Grammenos (2014) for ANED 
 
